A live forensic distribution writing to a suspect drive

Previously, I demonstrated that a live forensic distribution can automatically mount file systems on suspect (internal) drives during the boot process. Also, a proof-of-concept scenario was developed to show that this issue can lead to automatic execution of malicious code (i.e., a program located on a suspect drive gets executed by a live forensic distribution during the boot).

Today, let’s talk about other implications of that issue.

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A live forensic distribution executing malicious code from a suspect drive


My name is Maxim Suhanov and this is my first post in this blog. Let’s begin!

Live forensic distributions are extensively used during the triage and acquisition stages of digital media examination. Many practitioners rely on these distributions to perform a forensically sound acquisition of suspect media.

But how do examiners ensure that this acquisition process is forensically sound? Basically, there are four sources to consider when evaluating a tool: claims made by a vendor of a given tool, validation reports from a third-party organization (e.g., NIST), experience shared by other practitioners in the field, and tests conducted by you. The last one is the most important one.

Do you know how to conduct a validation test against a live forensic distribution? Sounds easy… Also, there are some validation guidelines published online. But such tests typically utilize a black-box setup: write known data to a drive – perform an acquisition – compare a copy to original (known) data; and I found that it’s extremely hard to catch many issues with the forensic soundness when performing such black-box tests.

This is why I decided to start a series of blog posts to demonstrate and explain these issues.

Continue reading “A live forensic distribution executing malicious code from a suspect drive”