Although NTFS has been designed with case-sensitivity in mind, it’s used mostly in the case-insensitive environment. One can natively store, within the same directory, two or more files with their names differing only in case, but Windows-based tools won’t deal with them correctly. To provide true case-sensitivity, Microsoft implemented an additional layer, per-directory case-sensitivity, as described here, here, and here.
But there are several issues with usual, case-insensitive, operations…
Continue reading “Playing with case-insensitive file names”
This is a reply to the Sunday Funday 12/30/18 challenge.
The following results represent an attempt to understand what Windows components write to the Syscache hive in a Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 installation (64-bit; with updates installed as of January 3, 2019).
Continue reading “What writes to the Syscache hive?”
A registry hive is very similar to a file system. In fact, there isn’t much difference between a file system and a registry hive except that the registry doesn’t follow usual file system naming rules.
Like a file system, a registry hive can contain deleted data, which is often recovered and used in digital forensics, incident response, and similar activities. But tools that recover such deleted data aren’t the same. And here is why.
Continue reading “Tools that recover deleted registry data don’t do the same job”
Previously, I demonstrated that a live forensic distribution can automatically mount file systems on suspect (internal) drives during the boot process. Also, a proof-of-concept scenario was developed to show that this issue can lead to automatic execution of malicious code (i.e., a program located on a suspect drive gets executed by a live forensic distribution during the boot).
Today, let’s talk about other implications of that issue.
Continue reading “A live forensic distribution writing to a suspect drive”
My name is Maxim Suhanov and this is my first post in this blog. Let’s begin!
Live forensic distributions are extensively used during the triage and acquisition stages of digital media examination. Many practitioners rely on these distributions to perform a forensically sound acquisition of suspect media.
But how do examiners ensure that this acquisition process is forensically sound? Basically, there are four sources to consider when evaluating a tool: claims made by a vendor of a given tool, validation reports from a third-party organization (e.g., NIST), experience shared by other practitioners in the field, and tests conducted by you. The last one is the most important one.
Do you know how to conduct a validation test against a live forensic distribution? Sounds easy… Also, there are some validation guidelines published online. But such tests typically utilize a black-box setup: write known data to a drive – perform an acquisition – compare a copy to original (known) data; and I found that it’s extremely hard to catch many issues with the forensic soundness when performing such black-box tests.
This is why I decided to start a series of blog posts to demonstrate and explain these issues.
Continue reading “A live forensic distribution executing malicious code from a suspect drive”